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The changing model of big pharma:
impact of key trends
Ajay Gautam, ajay.gautam@astrazeneca.com and Xiaogang Pan
Recent years have seen exciting breakthroughs in biomedical sciences that are producing truly novel
therapeutics for unmet patient needs. However, the pharmaceutical industry is also facing significant
barriers in the form of pricing and reimbursement, continued patent expirations and challenging
market dynamics. In this article, we have analyzed data from the 1995–2015 period, on key aspects such
as revenue distribution, research units, portfolio mix and emerging markets to identify four key trends
that help to understand the change in strategic focus, realignment of R&D footprint, the shift from
primary care toward specialty drugs and biologics and the growth of emerging markets as major revenue
drivers for big pharma.
Introduction
Big pharma has seen a significant change in
We collected data across different parameters
such as: revenue percentage from biologics,
 massive to lean;
 hubs to hotspots;

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couple of decades. Several studies have reviewed
the industry’s declining productivity challenges
[1,2], the transitioning of commercial models [3,4]
and the growth of emerging markets as key
revenue contributors [5]. In this article, we have
reviewed the key trends that have impacted and
transformed the big pharma companies over the
past 20 years. The current big pharma model is
transitioning to that of a lean, focused company
with a research footprint within key innovation
bioclusters and a growing revenue stream from
specialty products and biologics and emerging
markets. By contrast, the 1990s and early 2000s
model was that of a large, diversified company
with R&D footprints in multiple global hubs, and
primary care businesses driving a large portion of
revenues with minimal contribution from the
emerging economies.1359-6446/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an o
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drudis.2015.10.002 specialty and primary care portfolios; mergers
and acquisitions; regional growth rates; research
footprint and sites globally; revenue split be-
tween the established (USA, Europe and Canada)
and the emerging (Asia, Latin America, Russia,
Middle East and Africa) markets; among others.
We used public and proprietary sources such as
IMS Health (http://www.imshealth.com/), com-
pany annual filings, industry reports and press
releases for the top 12 innovation-driven phar-
maceutical companies. The data were analyzed
over two contiguous ten-year time periods of
1995–2005 and 2005–2015 to understand the
changes and any trends over the past two
decades. We chose a ten-year period for the data
analysis because that is a relevant timeline for a
full R&D cycle for the pharmaceutical industry.
Our data review revealed four trends that we
have classified as:pen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommoprimary to specialty;
 West to East.
Each of these trends and the impact on the big
pharma operating model is discussed in more
detail below.
The key trends impacting the big pharma
model
Massive to lean
The 1995–2005 period was marked with intense
mergers and acquisition activity, starting with
the mergers between Astra and Zeneca, Ciba-
Geigy and Sandoz, Pfizer and Warner Lambert,
Sanofi and Aventis, and Glaxo and SmithKline,
culminating with the Pfizer-Pharmacia merger in
2003 (Table 1). A push for the ‘bigger is better’
model resulted in bloated operations across the
globe – large R&D hubs, armies of sales reps,
multiple manufacturing sites, often confusingns.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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TABLE 1
Massive-to-lean strategy.
Expanding organizations Company Leaner, focused organizations
Astra and Zeneca merger 1999 AstraZeneca 2014 Narrow therapy areas from five to three
Acquired MedImmune 2007
Merged with Schering 2006 Bayer 2014 Divested material science and specialty chemicals businesses
Acquired biologics expertise
through Medarex
2009 Bristol-Myers Squibb 2008 Divestiture of medical imaging and wound care businesses
2009 Spin-off of nutrition business Mead-Johnson
2014 Divested diabetes business to AstraZeneca; focus on
three therapy areas
Merger of GlaxoWellcome and
SmithKline Beecham
2000 GlaxoSmithKline 2014 Swapped oncology for consumer health and
vaccines with Novartis
Acquired Schering-Plough 2009 Merck 2014 Divested consumer health to Bayer
Merger of Ceiba-Geigy and Sandoz 1996 Novartis 2014 Divest animal health to Eli Lilly; swapped vaccines and
consumer health for oncology with GSK
Acquired Warner Lambert 2000 Pfizer 2006 Divested consumer health to JNJ
Acquired Pharmacia 2003 2012 Spin-out animal health unit (Zoetis)
Acquired Wyeth 2009 2012 Divested nutrition business to Nestle
2015 Acquired Hospira for biosimilars
On track to split into three businesses: innovative pharma;
established products; oncology/vaccines
Acquired biologics expertise
through Genentech
2009 Roche
Merger of Synthe´labo and Sanofi 1999 Sanofi 2011 Acquired biologics expertise through Genzyme
Merger of Aventis and Sanofi 2004
Abbott 2013 Split into two companies: Abbott for diversified healthcare
products and AbbVie for innovative pharma business
AbbVie 2015 Acquired Pharmacyclics for oncology business
Baxter 2015 Divested innovative pharma business as Baxalta
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compounded by a lack of cultural integration of
the merged companies. A consolidation in the
industry was justified by economies of scale,
diversified portfolios and businesses across the
healthcare spectrum as an antidote to looming
patent cliffs, and to overcome declining R&D
productivity.
By contrast, since the late 2000s, big pharma
has started to embrace a ‘leaner and focused’
model by divesting non-core assets and focusing
on their areas of strengths (Table 1). Consider
some recent examples: Abbott split into two
parts [an innovative business (AbbVie) and a
diversified healthcare company (Abbott)]; GSK
and Novartis swapped their oncology, consumer
health and vaccines business to create focused
organizations with GSK increasing the focus on
consumer health and vaccines and Novartis on
oncology; AstraZeneca narrowed the focus to
three core therapy areas of oncology, cardio-
vascular-metabolism and respiratory, inflamma-
tion and autoimmune disease, and in the process
divested infectious disease and created a semi-
autonomous, virtual unit for neuroscience; and
Bristol Myers-Squibb (probably the most trans-
formative) divested large parts of the organiza-
tion (medical devices, nutrition, consumer380 www.drugdiscoverytoday.comhealth, multiple therapy areas) to position as a
specialty company in oncology, cardiology and
virology.
This is not to suggest that the 2005–2015
period has not witnessed significant acquisitions
– Roche and Genentech for biologics in 2009 as
well as Sanofi and Genzyme for rare diseases and
biologics in 2011 are such cases, as are Pfizer’s
acquisition of Wyeth for biologics and of Hospira
for entering biosimilar business and AbbVie’s
acquisition of Pharmacyclics for oncology busi-
ness and to offset reliance on Humira1. But
acquisitions during this period were largely
driven by strategic rationale and to build com-
plimentary capabilities rather than a desire to be
‘massive’. Of course, over the past couple of years,
acquisitions driven by tax inversions have also
been popular, such as Valeant’s multiple acqui-
sitions, Actavis-Watson-Allergan mergers and
Mylan acquisition of Abbott’s European generics
business, among others. But these are as much, if
not more, a result of financial engineering as
they are of pure strategic drivers, as well as a
desire by smaller players to gain scale and
geographic reach. It is an interesting dichotomy
where the large players are seeking to be fo-
cused and leaner through divesting, whereas
smaller players are following the ‘bigger is better’playbook of big pharma from the 1990s to
become massive.
Hubs to hotspots
The wave of mega acquisitions was largely
triggered by declining R&D productivity. The
economies of scale were used as one justification
for integrating the dispersed research units and
therapy areas across the merged companies. An
unintended consequence was creation of mul-
tiple research hubs across the globe: Pfizer’s
multiple units in the USA and UK; AstraZeneca’s
research sites in Sweden, USA, Canada and UK;
Roche’s US and Switzerland sites; Novartis sites in
the UK, USA and Switzerland; GSK’s US and UK
units, among others (Fig. 1). These sites created
self-contained silos that were used as research
units for high-throughput technologies in an
attempt to throw more money and hands at
solving scientific challenges – a ‘more shots on
goals’ strategy.
The past decade, by contrast, was marked with
a desire to locate within bioscience hotspots –
the innovation clusters such as Boston, San
Francisco, San Diego, Cambridge and London in
the UK, Shanghai – which are increasingly the
key centers for producing breakthrough science.
Localizing their research units in these hotspots
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Hubs to hotspots
Mega M&A;
Large R&D footprint
Mega M&A;
Moderate R&D footprint
No Mega M&A
AstraZeneca•
GSK•
Novartis•
Pfizer•
Sanofi•
Bayer
Merck
Roche
•
•
•
Abbott / AbbVie
BMS
Eli Lilly
JNJ
•
•
•
•
6~10
10+ R&D sites
<5
Consolidating
existing internal
R&D centers
USA
Boston, San
Francisco
Asia
Shanghai,
China
UK
Cambridge,
London
AstraZeneca, BMS, JNJ, Novartis, Pfizer,
Roche, Sanofi
AstraZeneca, GSK, JNJ, Pfizer
AstraZeneca, GSK, JNJ, Eli Lilly, Merck,
Novartis, Roche, Sanofi
Consolidation of R&D footprint
and shift from hubs to hotspots
Hubs model
(1995–2005)
Hotspots model
(2005–2015)
Drug Discovery Today 
FIGURE 1
The data for our big pharma cohort reveals a shrinking R&D footprint and shift from large hubs to innovation hotspots. Qualitative and quantitative data are
shown. Source: industry reports, company filings and press releases.
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with external researchers and clinicians in pro-
gressing their drug pipeline, a much more open
and collaborative model versus the ‘not invented
here’ syndrome of the hubs model. Novartis was
probably a pioneer in this trend, relocating its
research headquarters to Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts, in the early 2000s and several of the big
pharma companies followed suit. Roche closed
its Nutley site in New Jersey and moved to New
York City, another innovation hotspot, as well as
having consolidated US research operations inSouth San Francisco. In 2013, AstraZeneca an-
nounced that it would move its research head-
quarters from Alderley Park, UK, to Cambridge,
UK, which is a rich scientific and entrepreneurial
ecosystem. In 2013, JNJ established its innova-
tion centers in key hotspots globally: San Fran-
cisco, Boston, London and Shanghai, and Merck
and BMS are also implementing this approach.
There are still large hubs: the Roche and Novartis
sites in Basel, Switzerland, the Lilly site in
Indianapolis and Merck in New Jersey, to name a
few, but the trend toward hotspots is clear.Over the past decade, big pharma’s R&D or-
ganizations have also experienced a paradigm
shift by experimenting more entrepreneurial
internal biotech units. Two such examples are
GSK’s Discovery Performance Unit and AstraZe-
neca’s Virtual Neuroscience Unit. Further, the
research units have increasingly used CROs and
CMOs for strategic drug discovery alliances, such
as Pfizer’s strategic partnerships with Parexel,
Icon and PPD, and AstraZeneca’s partnerships
with Wuxi AppTec and Pharmaron, rather than
perform such functions within their hithertowww.drugdiscoverytoday.com 381
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Primary-light, specialty-heavy: sales of specialty and biologics drugs 
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FIGURE 2
Data showing specialty and biologics products growth for big pharma cohort in our study during the 2010–2014 period. Majority of the companies saw an
increase in specialty pharmaceuticals (a) and biologics (b) sales as proportion of portfolio during the period. The biologics proportion of the pipelines of various
companies also reveals 20–60% of the portfolio comprised such molecules (c). Source: IMS Health Analytics. Specialty and biologics sales and pipeline distribution
are as per IMS Health definitions and data.
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spots has also allowed big pharma research
organizations to broaden the access of external
innovation through targeted alliances and col-
laborations with the academic institutions and
biotechs in these innovation ecosystems.
Primary-light, specialty-heavy
The 1995–2005 period was the quintessential
blockbuster drugs era for big pharma, so much
so that two of the largest mergers in the industry
were primarily driven by single blockbusters:
Lipitor1 in case of Pfizer-Warner Lambert and
Celebrex1 in case of Pfizer-Pharmacia. Some of
the biggest-selling drugs in the industry’s history
– Lipitor1, Plavix1, Nexium1, Abilify1, Sero-
quel1, Diovan1, Crestor1, among others – were
launched during this period. Further, most of the
top-selling drugs during the 1995–2005 period
were primary care, small-molecule therapies.
During this period, the primary care therapy
areas accounted for 80% of revenues for most
of the big pharma portfolios.
Over the past decade, however, big pharma
has been shifting away from developing primary382 www.drugdiscoverytoday.comcare and small-molecule medicines, and pro-
gressively tailoring their pipelines to specialty
medicines and biologics targeted for high unmet
medical needs. The trend is driven by several
factors such as: better understanding of the
underlying disease biology to develop targeted
medicines; science and technology innovation
for biologics; personalized medicines and com-
panion diagnostics; favorable regulatory frame-
work and development timelines for such
medicines; and pricing and reimbursement.
Big pharma largely missed the biologics wave
early on, and caught up to the antibody, protein
and cell therapies during the 2005–2015 period
primarily through targeted acquisitions such as
Roche-Genentech, Sanofi-Genzyme, Lilly-
Imclone, BMS-Medarex, AstraZeneca-MedIm-
mune and Pfizer-Wyeth. By 2015 this effort started
to bear fruits and most of the big pharma port-
folios now have an even distribution between
specialty and primary care units, as well as the
development pipelines that are evenly distributed
between small- and large-molecule drug candi-
dates. In 2014, for example, primary care
medicines only accounted for approximatelyone-quarter of new FDA-approved new molecular
entities (NMEs), as per consulting firm PwC’s
Health Research Institute study.
Over the past couple of decades, most big
pharma companies have also observed in-
creased revenues from the specialty medicines
and biologics portion of their portfolios, with
several big pharma companies showing a
greater than 10% absolute percentage increase
for proportion of specialty products and biolo-
gics during the 2010–2014 period, as per IMS
Health data (Fig. 2). Although AstraZeneca, Lilly
and Merck observed a drop of percentage sales
of specialty medicines over the past five years, it
was mainly caused by patent expiration of the
top-selling medicines, such as Zyprexa1 for Eli
Lilly, Taxotere1 for Sanofi and Seroquel1 for
AstraZeneca. The development pipelines have
clearly shown a ramp-up and increased focus on
specialty and biologic medicines as part of
overall company portfolios as well, with Astra-
Zeneca’s 40% of clinical stage molecules being
biologics, and the split being 30% and 58%
biologics for Sanofi and Eli Lilly, respectively, as
per IMS Health data.
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FIGURE 3
(a) West to East: global pharmaceutical sales by region. Data showing global pharmaceutical sales in constant dollars. During the 2000–2014 period, Asia-Pacific/
Africa region saw a 5%+ increase in share of global pharmaceutical sales. Latin America increased 2% share during the same period, whereas the North America
saw a decline of 6% and Europe had essentially a flat-to-modest decline. Source: IMS Health World Review Analysis. Regional sales distributions are as per IMS
Health definitions and data. (b,c) West to East: big pharma sales and growth rate outside the USA and EU. (b) Data showing average global pharmaceutical sales in
constant dollars. During the 2000–2014 period, the big pharma companies in our dataset saw sales proportion from Asia Pacific and emerging markets increase by
10% in absolute terms. (c) Data showing average cumulative sales growth during the 2010–2014 period in key markets. Majority of the sales growth outside the
USA, EU and Japan came from key markets such as China, Brazil and Russia. The average sales growth (cumulative) for the big pharma cohort in our study was
88% in China during the 2010–2014 period, whereas US sales declined by 3%. Source: Company Annual Reports and IMS Health Analytics. The regional sales
distribution is as per IMS Health definition and data.
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Whereas North America and Europe were the
leading major markets for the global pharma-
ceutical industry in the 1995–2005 period, the
emerging markets of Asia, Latin America, Russia,
Middle-East and Africa continue to spearhead
revenue growth over the recent decade owing to
strong demand and economic fundamentals
(Fig. 3a). During the 1995–2005 period none of the
big pharma companies in our study had more
than 20% revenues derived from the emerging
markets. By contrast, during the following decade
of 2005–2015 most big pharma companies grewtheir portfolios to comprise at least 25% of the
total revenues from the Asia Pacific and emerging
markets, with the figure as high as 35% for
Sanofi. In 2014, for example, AstraZeneca sales
from these markets accounted for US$6 billion
in revenues and emerging markets accounted for
US$14 billion sales for Sanofi and US$10 bil-
lion for GSK, as per company annual filings. China
has largely been the driver for such stupendous
growth, but Brazil and Russia have contributed
significantly as well (Fig. 3b,c).
There is, however, a bifurcation in this West to
East dynamics, depending on the diversificationof company portfolios between primary versus
specialty-heavy businesses. Firms such as
AstraZeneca, GSK, Pfizer and Merck saw
emerging market businesses grow significantly
as a proportion of global revenues because of
the patent expiry of products in the USA, Canada
and EU during the 2005–2015 period and a
concomitant growth of their largely primary care
business in the emerging markets. Other firms
with heavier biologics focus such as Roche, JNJ
and Amgen did not see as much increase in
emerging markets revenue ratios because they
did not face as severe a patent cliff in Northwww.drugdiscoverytoday.com 383
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had primary-care-focused portfolios.
Not just commercially, the emerging markets,
specifically China, have also seen a large increase
in innovation capabilities [6] over the past de-
cade. As the world’s second-largest pharma-
ceutical market, backed by significant
government and private capital, growing talent
pool of experienced Western-trained returnees
and home-grown professionals and an evolving
life science ecosystem [7], China is rapidly pro-
gressing as a hotspot for global innovation. Most
big pharma companies have established their
research units in China including AstraZeneca, Eli
Lilly, GSK, JNJ, Novartis, Roche and Sanofi, all in
Shanghai, and Merck, Novo Nordisk and Bayer in
Beijing. Amgen is the latest to announce
establishing a research unit at the ShanghaiTech
University in 2014.
Concluding remarks: what might 2015–
2025 look like?
The demand for new therapies will continue to
see steady growth, a favorable trend for the
long-term industry dynamics [8]. However, there
are significant challenges for the industry such
as: continued patent expiration; regulatory
hurdles; access, pricing and reimbursement; and
R&D productivity. Big pharma companies have
been revamping their strategies to remain
competitive in this new business environment.
The major players are rapidly aligning into two
distinct camps: (i) a diversified business, such as
Abbott, Bayer, Eli Lilly, GSK, JNJ, Merck and
Sanofi, that has a mix of diagnostics, generics,
medical devices, innovative drugs, consumer
health and animal health businesses under a
single umbrella organization; and (ii) pure play
biopharma companies such as AbbVie, Astra-
Zeneca, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Novartis, Pfizer
and Roche, which are focused primarily on in-
novative drugs (we have assumed Novartis and
Pfizer to be transitioning toward pure play bio-
pharma based on their strategic plans to divest
or split non-core and adjacent businesses).
Within the two camps, the companies have
adopted diverse strategies to evolve their busi-
nesses: the pursuit of specialty medicine and
biologics; asset-swapping to focus on leadership
businesses and exit non-aligned portfolios;
geographic expansion and regional consolida-
tion; R&D restructuring; and bolt-on acquisitions
and partnership. We envision big pharma’s
business model will continue to evolve over the
next decade, with each of the four key trends
identified here continuing to shape the industry.
A key challenge over the coming decade
will be affordability – the new and exciting384 www.drugdiscoverytoday.combreakthroughs in immuno-oncology [9], respi-
ratory, stem cells, gene therapy and technology
platforms such as clustered regularly interspaced
short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) and RNA
therapeutics [10,11] will pave way for effective,
novel drugs. However, these therapies continue
to be expensive and new pricing and reim-
bursement models are needed to make them
more affordable for patients. Providing sustain-
able access to healthcare will be a significant
global challenge for all stakeholders – govern-
ment, payers and healthcare companies – and
this is, and will continue to be, the case for the
emerging economies where healthcare systems
are largely out-of-pocket. These emerging mar-
kets, however, account for almost one-quarter-
to-one-half of the revenues for big pharma. How
the companies price these products and
broaden the access of medicines is a key chal-
lenge for the next decade. New models such as
coverage assistance, tiered pricing, perfor-
mance-based models, among others, will need
to be broadly explored and implemented. The
partnership of Gilead with Indian generic firms to
provide affordable access to sofosbuvir (mar-
keted under the brand name Solvadi1 for
hepatitis C disease) in the Indian subcontinent,
and that of Roche with private insurers in China
for access to biologics drugs, are examples of
such models being tested.
The convergence of IT and healthcare is an-
other area that would impact the big pharma
model over the coming years. Big data and
mobile health are starting to transform health-
care and diagnostics in a significant way, with
new players such as Apple and Google acting as
increasingly disruptive catalysts. Medicines
paired with companion diagnostics have been a
successful strategy to gain market access, and
firms such as AstraZeneca, Roche, Novartis and
Sanofi are progressing as much as 60–80% of
their clinical portfolios with companion diag-
nostics. In the personalized and precision med-
icines era, this strategy will probably translate
into medicines accompanied with apps or
wearable devices that help patients monitor key
parameters and manage their diseases. How big
pharma adapts to this ‘beyond-the-pill’ model
will be an interesting development during the
2015–2025 period.
Finally, there is likely to be a new breed of
companies that will start to emerge from
countries such as China, India, Korea and Brazil to
challenge the long-held leadership of US and
European companies. The top 10 largest com-
panies globally across all industries in 1995–2005
were all from the USA or Europe; today at least
half of the top 10 is from emerging markets,primarily China [12]. The pharmaceuticals in-
dustry, given the long development timelines
and regulatory hurdles, is still dominated by US
and European players. There are, however,
aspirations from companies such as Sun Pharma
from India, Teva from Israel, Celltrion and Hanmi
from Korea, Hengrui Pharma and Fosun Pharma
from China, EMS Pharma from Brazil, among
others, to be leading global players. It is unlikely
that any of these firms will become global
innovators imminently, but by 2025 some of
these emerging markets companies could be in
a position to compete with global leaders such
as Pfizer, Novartis, AstraZeneca and Merck.
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